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The controversy over imageless thought versus picture thinking (especially via mechanical models), with
the recent reconsideration of model-based reasoning in the physical sciences is briefly examined. The
main focus of the article is on the role of instrumentally elicited images (scopic instruments, cameras,
CCDs) in the sciences, especially in the physical sciences, with special reference to optics, experimental
particle physics and observational astronomy, against the background of the civilization of digital im-
ages, though to some degree every scientific discipline is implicated. Imaging, today chiefly in the mode
of electronic digital visual imaging, reaches into every phase of scientific inquiry, observational, experi-
mental, simulational, even in mathematical research. The combination of algorithms and image-inten-
sive science with the plethora of big data results in an epistemic pattern of “mathematical imagism”. The
epistemological issues regarding the image-intensiveness as of data-intensiveness of scientific research
deserve further probing, in pursuance of the discussions of the ideal of mechanical objectivity in ma-
chine vision (an ever greater proportion of scientific visualization) versus trained judgment in the selec-
tion and assessment of scientific images: as for now tacitly we depend on conventions regarding what we
called “warranted imageability”.
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I will not be concerned with the role of mental imagery (“pictures in our heads”) in
scientific cognition, and especially in scientific creativity, a topic which has attracted a
lot of interest lately, not least in connexion with renewed interest in gedankenexperimente
(cf. Miller, 1984), nor with the cognitive science approach to model-based reasoning
in, for example, physics, which images may play an important part, as in the work of
Maxwell (cf. Nersessian, 2008). My sole concern is with visual images elicited by in-
struments, and mostly with photographs, still or moving, in scientific research. The
bulk of the literature deals with visual rather than auditory models, the relevance of
which was pointed out long ago by the philosopher of physics, Milic Capek (1961), but
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has attracted little attention since in mainstream science studies. In this paper my
examples will be drawn mostly from the physical sciences, and to some extent biology,
mostly excluding the social and human sciences (and thus visual anthropology and visual
sociology), and the environmental sciences, where imaging is so important today, and
visual representation preeminent for nearly two centuries.
1 Science and the “civilization of images”
The “cultural sensorium”, the typical value hierarchy of the senses, of the West, has
raised sight to the top, with hearing in the second place, the distance senses, at least
since Aristotle eulogized vision at the beginning of his Metaphysics (cf. Jonas, 1966a).
In recent times the hegemony of vision in the West, its prepotent “ocular-centric” bias,
the “despotism of the eye” of Coleridge (cf. Engell & Bate, 1983 [1817]), have been the
target of critics of scientific rationality and technological civilization (cf. Jay, 1993a;
1993b). The West has built the glass civilization par excellence, surpassing all others in
the widespread and multifunctional use of glass in mirrors, lenses, devices, windows,
buildings (cf. Macfarlane & Martin, 2003). In the West, for the first time, there took
place an extraordinary diffusion of glass mirrors and glass windows, even in the hum-
blest domestic settings, an obsession with light, centuries of advances in the glass in-
dustry, a unique development of urban glass architecture, a steady development of the
arts and technologies of seeing. Specifically, the invention of innumerable “scopic”
instruments of ever-increasing capabilities, originally in the context of early modern
“natural magic” (cf. Hankins & Silverman, 1995), before being incorporated in rou-
tine scientific practices, from the spread of “eyeglasses” in the Middle Ages to the pow-
ered automated super-telescopes of today has sustained a centuries-long and now ac-
celerating growth of observational science.1 Science came to depend also, with the
printing revolution and linear perspective, on prints, engravings and printed draw-
ings for anatomy and natural history, in particular. The Encyclopédie of Diderot and
D’Alembert contained a large number of plates depicting the state of all the major arts
and crafts in Europe.
But it was photography which multiplied beyond measure the actual and poten-
tial image repertoire of scientific inquiry and truly launched the “civilization of im-
ages” (cf. Gusdorf, 1960) in which we dwell, more specifically a “civilization of prolif-
erating image technologies”, now above all the “civilization of digital images”. In fact,
1 As late as the mid-twentieth century the famous biologist E. O. Wilson did much of his work on entomology with a
magnifying glass.
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photography was deployed for scientific uses at its inception: the first astronomical
photograph was taken in 1839 by Louis Daguerre himself. At any rate, this was the first
such to be legitimated by a prominent scientist, François Arago, for whom it inaugu-
rated an epoch of photography of great value for scientific knowledge (cf. Sicard, 1998).
The regular use of photographic images in scientific investigation, or even for provid-
ing records of artifacts or other objects to complement verbal descriptions, emerged
within a couple of decades or so, Marey, Muybridge and Galton being some of the key
names in this connection. The extraordinary series of photographs by the French physi-
ologist Duchenne de Boulogne of the activation of facial muscles published in his Al-
bum of pathological photographs (1862) inspired Darwin’s treatment of facial expres-
sions in The expression of the emotions in man and animals¸ ten years later (cf. Sicard,
1998). In the 1880s Ernst Mach developed a high-speed photographic apparatus to track
the shock waves of bullets and shells in his pioneering research on supersonic motion.
With the serendipitous discovery of X-rays photography in 1897, and especially after
that of X-rays diffraction, this kind of photography became very widely deployed for
scientific and medical purposes. The X-ray photographs taken by Rosalind Franklin in
the process that led to the formulation of the double helix model of the structure of
DNA in 1953 remain the greatest single achievement of the genre.
“Perceptual revolutions” have been defined as “radical changes to the way in
which a viewer perceives almost any visible change” (Novitz, 1977, p. 124): “a number
of pictorial styles have prompted viewers to look at depicted objects in terms of pic-
tures of them” (p. 122-3). The diffusion of photography certainly brought about a per-
ceptual revolution on a grander scale than any other in history till then, as the major
promoter of the “civilization of images”, for the photograph taught us to see the world
photographically (cf. Ivins, 1953, p. 94).2 It thereby made the world available in new
ways for both aesthetic and scientific apperception.
Photography was at first imputed an eminent degree of veracity, of representa-
tive realism, of fidelity to the real (or at least to appearances), comparable only to the
best-authenticated empirical scientific knowledge, or to veridical sense-perception.
It became clear that this was not so, inasmuch as falsifications and distortions could
arise, by design or not, and therefore, for scientific purposes, controls were needed as
for other data-gathering and observation-recording pursuits, such as telescopic or
2 New modes of perception can also be induced through non-image technologies such as “panoramic perception”,
elicited by railway travel in the early nineteenth century: “the empirical reality that made the landscape seen from
the train window appears to be ‘another world’ was the railroad itself” (Schivelbusch, 1979, p. 24). But even before
the fashion for balloons starting in the eighteenth century had afforded a similar kind of panoramic perception with
aerial rather than terrestrial views. “Panoramas” in the original sense of entertainment devices, popular until the
1860s, familiarized many with an ersatz experience of this kind.
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microscopic investigations. Even in the late nineteenth century some astronomers still
raised doubts about the scientific validity of astronomical photography, just as doubts
had been raised much earlier about the epistemic warrant of the observations in Gali-
leo’s telescope, and similar doubts would be raised in the mid-twentieth century about
the cognitive reliability of electronic microscope, and that of the radar telescope, as
against the optical versions, at the time of their introduction. A notorious controversy
over the issue took place between two outstanding Cambridge astrophysicists, Fred
Hoyle and Martin Ryle, in the 1960s. No such heated controversy has taken place over
the epistemic import of subsequent image technologies in exact science, at least not
among scientists. A counter-strategy would be to automate or mechanize the whole
process of the production of photographic images, in the search of what one might call
absolute machine vision, untainted by human perceptual flaws, unconscious inferences
(the “optical unconscious” of Benjamin), or human mishandling of any kind, accord-
ing to what has been called “the ideal of mechanical objectivity”. To be sure, it is sup-
posed that the imaging technology does not causally affect the putative representandum
so as to distort the fidelity of the representamen. Such alleged effects were the ground
for the initial objections to the electronic microscope. The ideal of mechanical objec-
tivity was most challenged in the philosophy of science by the physical chemist and
thinker Michael Polanyi (1958).
Digital images – substantially different from analog photographs, hence the term
“post-photographic” era (cf. Mitchell, 1992) – carry out this aim of algorithmicization
through and through of the process of imaging, which has seemed technologically fea-
sible, with very powerful robotized telescopes, or with space probes transmitting data
at enormous distances from the Earth, for example. Machine vision flourishes as never
before, in and out of science, encompassing the biggest chunks of the world made avail-
able to scientists for visual inspection, not least where humans could not be present,
as in deep space, and telescopically reaching out to many million light-years, even bil-
lions.3 But in the end human perception has to come into it, and it does not seem pos-
sible to forestall the “fallacy of immaculate perception” (Sellars, 1968), no matter how
automated the processes of image capture and storage may be, human knowers are not
perfect perceivers, even if attaining a high degree of veridical perception, no doubt
explained by natural selection, directly or indirectly (so much we can concede to evo-
lutionary epistemology), and representations of any kind are necessarily bound up with
3 Machine sounds also became salient in the soundscapes of cities from the late nineteenth century and the Italian
Futurists of the early twentieth century never ceased to proclaim their defining role in urban-industrial societies. In
science, despite the advances in sonification, detected sounds are, in general, translated into audiographs, digital
read-outs and visual images for the purposes of research.
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conventions of one sort or another, more or less theoretically grounded, even if infor-
mally or tacitly.
There is also the path of endowing ourselves with digital electronic super-senses,
so that our vision could switch from our normal mode to a telescopic or microscopic
mode, and back again, and our other senses could be similarly “augmented”, if not so
easily. Whether acquiring an electronic digital super-sensorium coupled to our still-
organic body, possibly connected to an electronic super-motorium (via an exoskeleton,
for example) is something of interest for the pursuit of science is questionable, though
we would become super-percipients, or at least super-visualizers. Yet another way of
significantly amplifying the seen world for everyone would be if the “perfect lens”, or
“superlens”, is manufactured, as seems possible theoretically with metamaterials, and
a miniature ultra-high resolution microscope becomes as common as cameras in
smartphones and other mobile devices: such a microscope would enable us to see a
virus in a drop of blood, for example. “Deep seeing” of the micro-world would be de-
mocratized, we would all feel closer to the nanoworld, citizen science (which contin-
ues to play an important role in, for example, observational astronomy, as well as in
taxonomic tasks in and out of astronomy) further enabled another extension of the
humanly visualizable world. (One is irresistibly reminded of Swift’s Lilliputians). On a
more modest scale, the embedding of perfected 3-D imaging devices in mobile phones
would significantly enhance visualization of the outer world for everyone. However,
such extensions would still be bound to Euclidean visual space, a cultural artifact of
modernity, rather than the recovery or re-inclusion of hyperbolic visual space together
with Euclidean space “within an enlarged realism [which] would make a positive state-
ment about the primacy of perception, and the centrality to perception of physical
embodiment in the (material fabric) of the universe” (Heelan, 1983, p. 278).
The project of universal observation and recording, or “mapping” of everything
visible at the highest degrees of resolution or magnification continues to appeal. In
any case, the classes of visibilia, the classes of things, or aspects of things, that can be
made visible or detected, or even measured, for visibilia can be mensuranda, through
electronic technology, increase daily.4 This was also coupled with the potentialities of
photographic representation, envisaging a “total” continuous photographic record in
at least fragments of natural history or in specific areas of human behavior, a project
which has recurred in connection with computational devices, electronic sensors,
probes, observational geosynchronous satellites, and so on, as they emerged in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century. In the pursuit of science, as well as in all kinds of
4 Paradoxically, we have also been discovering that the unseen and what cannot be seen, in the form of dark matter
or dark energy, does make up the bulk of the universe.
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other endeavors, anything and everything has become a potential object of photogra-
phy, still or cinematic, regardless of moral reservations or religious interdictions.
However, few research fields in the natural sciences relying on photography or film
acquired special labels, like “cine-biology”, whereas in every science today the pre-
fixes “computational”, “cyber”, “digital”, or “e-” are pervasive, and conjoined to the
names of every science.
The role of images in the sciences entered a new phase when easily available
digital electronic computers with their ever-increasing processing power began to de-
velop substantial graphic and pictorial capabilites in the 1970s, though other key in-
novations, like computer simulations, had been pioneered in the 1950s.5 These ca-
pabilities have grown exponentially as processing power and storage capacity of
computers increase, doubling every two years, as they have done since the 1960s, ac-
cording to Moore’s law and Kryder’s law respectively, with a concomitant halving in
costs to the consumer. The advent of the PC made available to scientists vastly more
computer time than previously, when the scarcity of computer time was a key constraint
in scientific research, and, concurrently, far more processing power than the most
powerful computer classes, with the exception of the Cray supercomputers. In each
decade the average new computers enjoy the processing power that supercomputers
alone had in the previous decade. Instead of just number crunching, computers, or
computational devices, came to play roles in scientific research which had not been
anticipated (in fact, scientists looked for what they could do with the new computing
resources rather than having a clear-cut pre-established agenda of how to exploit them),
so far-reaching in its wealth of cognitive affordances,6 that scientists now speak of
computational science as a “third methodology of science” or a “third form of science”,
the “computational mode”, alongside the theoretical/mathematical and the experi-
mental modes of older vintage (cf. Kaufmann & Smarr, 1993, p. 4). Unlike the others,
it views reality itself in terms of discrete units, so it was, at least potentially, or in an “as
if” (als ob) mode, as much an ontological as a methodological revolution, at any rate a
shift in a preferred meta-scientific “theme”. It has certainly lent support to a meta-
physics of discreta rather than continua,7 even the claim, now widely shared amongst
physicists, that (digital) information should be construed as equiprimordial with matter
5 Monte Carlo simulation originated in the modeling work for the hydrogen bomb, via the efforts of the mathemati-
cians Ulam and von Neumann. Born in sin, one might say, even if two geniuses presided over its birth.
6 Using the term “affordance” in a sense akin to that of Gibson in the psychology of perception: the ensemble of the
possible operations one can perform (including the perceptual aspects of an object that can be elicited thereby) with
a device, especially those undesigned and unforeseen.
7 Of course, it is acknowledged that some kinds of atomic particles violate Leibniz’ law of the identity of indiscernibles,
that there cannot be numerical difference without qualitative difference.
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and energy, a “categorial revolution”, that is, involving not only conceptual change but,
more far-reachingly, the introduction of a new, fundamental category of thought. The
recent technological achievement of the single atom silicon transistor shows how close
matter and information can be brought. In any case, the science of computation itself
has claimed a status in the system of the sciences on a par with that of the physical or
life-sciences, and indeed in some ways overlapping with them, for leading physicists
and biologists argue for the existence of natural computational processes in the physi-
cal and biological worlds (cf. Rosenbloom, 2013).
Computers assist mathematicians with proofs of theorems (the four-colour map
theorem was finally proved in 1976, the first computer-assisted mathematical proof
ever), mapping topologies, transforming numerical data as they became available in
ever larger sets, in the empirical disciplines, astronomy/astrophysics and in a lot of
others, most strikingly perhaps for the lay public in neuroscience, into visual repre-
sentations, not least digital images, regarded as “photographs” by most laypersons,
endowed with “false colour” for ease of viewing.8 The computational mode of doing
science, of “sciencing”, could also be described as “visualization science”, as it rou-
tinely converts numerical data into images in the “dry laboratories” and the automated
observatories (where torrents of images may arrive daily). It is characteristic of its thrust
that in every scientific field today publications so often refer to “maps” and “mapping”,
from “mapping” the galaxies, and indeed all that can be captured by our instruments of
the cosmos (cf. Osserman, 1995), to “mapping the brain” via imaging technologies (even
“whole-brain mapping” may be routine), as in the Allen Brain Atlas, “mapping DNA”,
or mapping human haplotypes (the genetic differences in our species) or the HapMap,
or “mapping the mind” (cf. Carter, 1998), the Inner Geographies Project, and even to
mathematical “maps” on the computer screen, making the sciences appear as so many
variants of “cartography”, in a broad sense of the term, the terms “atlas”, “albums” or
“charters” being also very recurrent in a lot of scientific fields (cf. Hall, 1992). Such
characterizations suggest a “geographical exploration model” of scientific inquiry,
which would point to a completability in principle of the scientific world picture, and
thus the end of scientific revolutions in due course (cf. Rescher, 1978): not what “map-
ping” enthusiasts have in mind, perhaps. Long ago Stephen Toulmin (1961) compared
scientific theories to maps, in part also with the aim of discounting Kuhnian-type sci-
entific revolutions avant la lettre: not surprisingly, he later backed the development of
evolutionary epistemology against Kuhn.
8 Scientists call such pictures, and all pictures meant for display, rather than analysis, “pretty pictures” (they may be
endowed with other aesthetic attributes besides colour). Digital processing technologies have made their produc-
tion much easier, of course.
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The coming of computers with advanced graphic capabilities fostered the devel-
opment of chaos theory in the 1970s, a fertile theoretical approach in the physical sci-
ences, and the closely related complexity theory. Digital computers were not the key to
the emergence of chaos theory (which may be defined as the study of unpredictable
behavior in simple, bounded, deterministic systems). From about 1975 digital com-
puters enabling graphical displays became widely available and this made possible fur-
ther developments. Mathematical formulations of nonlinear dynamics which existed
since Henri Poincaré wrote the first ones in 1892, were revived and developed in the
1960s. Experimental evidence had been elicited repeatedly, but disregarded, “brack-
eted” or subjected to “institutionalized neglect”, owing to the regnant “clockwork uni-
verse” of classical physics (though some physicists and philosophers in the second half
of the nineteenth century argued that even within the framework of deterministic clas-
sical physics, unpredictability could arise). The resources of analogic computers would
have been sufficient for graphic displays, even if not as compellingly demonstrative as
those of the digital computers of the 1970s (cf. Kellert, 1993, p. 119-48).
In turn, chaos theory lent itself to further production of images not only of di-
dactic value but also, incidentally, with remarkable aesthetic properties as books like
The beauty of fractals showed.9 “While philosophical accounts [of science] typically cast
the item to be explained as a linguistic entity, researchers in chaos theory more often
will point to a computer graphics display and say, “this is what we need to understand”
(Kellert, 1993, p. 81, nota, my italics). The explanandum for these researchers would
not be an observation-statement, or even an e-reading (a numerical digital readout),
but what one may call an e-graphic, a graph generated by a digital computer. Digital
images can, of course, be stored, easily retrieved, shared, compared, replicated per-
fectly (though in a sense there are no originals), transmitted instantly to any number
of scientists anywhere, through computer-assisted communications (CMCs), includ-
ing communications satellites.
In practically every field of scientific inquiry, data abundance or data glut has
replaced the classical condition of chronic data scarcity or arduous data acquisition
(this circumstance may have a selective effect on those who stay the course after early
graduate work in the natural sciences): big data is by no means confined to what used
to be called “big science”. Special auxiliary subfields emerged devoted to fast – and
9 Further on this see chapter 5, entitled “Beautiful chaos”, of Kellert (2008). Mathematicians speak of the beauty of
proofs, physicists of the beauty of equations, and sometimes even of beautiful experiments. Artists don’t generally
speak of beauty anymore, but find varied aesthetic affordances in the scientific images of the day. Some are even
ecstatic about the “beauty” of the LHC, that super-machine, though perhaps a category mistake is involved, and
what they feel falls under the category of the sublime rather than of the beautiful, specifically an instance of the
“technological sublime” (cf. Marx, 1964; Nye, 1994), or the “technoscientific sublime” (cf. Hoffman & Whyte, 2011).
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ever faster – processing of huge data sets, such as bioinformatics, chemoinformatics
and neuroinformatics: indeed workers in these subfields have become full-time spe-
cialists, creating a further division of labor in the sciences, between data-gatherers
and data-analysts (scientists strive for something like Moore’s law in the information
growth of their own fields, and indeed genomic sequencing can now boast of having
surpassed Moore’s law). Ever more powerful scopic instruments have come along: be-
sides optical and radar telescopes, there are also radio, X-ray, infra-red and ultra-vio-
let telescopes, electronic and scanning probe microscopes, and the first atomic X-ray
laser was invented recently, opening a new window into the world of molecules and
atoms. They enabled visualization with unprecedented degrees of accuracy and reso-
lution in the cosmos and the microcosm (the digital microscope provides the image in
the monitor directly, bypassing the human eye).
Computer simulation is now routine in all the natural sciences; even in math-
ematics, such “numerical experiments” have come to be accepted, though still ques-
tioned by some (mathematics has become in part an experimental science, in this sense,
rather than that of physical experiments),10 and “virtual experiments”, as they are
sometimes called (cf. Rees, 2004),11 in other fields are conducted in “dry” laborato-
ries (science in silico), especially where actual physical experiments would be physi-
cally impossible in the “wet” laboratory (science in vitro), or otherwise barred, or if
they pertain to the inaccessible past or to future possibilia. They also take place as a
daily practice as a guide to the choice or design of the most appropriate physical, “real”
experiments. Computer simulation enables the exploration of counterfactual universes
(even if within the range allowed by the laws of physics), the creation of “would-be-
worlds” and the observation of their evolution, for the range of “free variation” of hy-
pothetical states-of-affairs that can be processed to construct alternative scenarios, to
imagine alternative realities, is immense, compared with what would have been feasi-
ble only a few years ago, with graphic displays, digital images or plotting points on screen
maps, to assist reasoning, or, as chaos theorists often put it, “to create intuition”. Like-
wise, thought-experiments in science and philosophy too have been characterized, in-
10 The new contrast between theoretical and experimental mathematics cuts across the old dichotomy between
pure and applied mathematics.
11 They used to be called “theoretical experiments” or “mathematical experiments”. Of course, thought-experi-
ments, unaided by computers or any other external device, could also be called “theoretical experiments”, carried
out in the “laboratory of the mind” (cf. Brown, 1993), and in recent years there has been much interest in the role of
gedankenexperimente, especially in the history of twentieth century physics between 1905 and the 1930s. Even as late
as the 1970s, some physicists questioned whether simulations should be called experiments, being done on keyboards
rather than on laboratory benches. The consensus view now is that the boundaries between computation and physical
experimentation (“bench experimentation”) have become blurred, paralleling the blurring of boundaries between
the cyber and the physical, the virtual and the real, taking place across the whole of the civilization of digital images.
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dependently, as “intuition pumps” (cf. Dennett, 1991). The extensive use of computer
simulations in climate science, and above all the predictions of major climate change,
and the anthropogenic role in it, based on them, have triggered much scepticism or
denial. Some of it is based on reasoned methodological argument, or empirical evi-
dence, but most is ideological or political. The research programs of artificial intelli-
gence and artificial life, in their weak or strong versions, must of course proceed through
computer simulations.12 Virtual experiments enable a certain kind of “virtual reality”
to be addressed. The term “virtual reality” came into circulation after its adoption by
the computer scientist and musician Jaron Lanier. It was derived from the terminol-
ogy of the philosopher Susanne Langer, who, in her writings on aesthetics, formulated
the concepts of “virtual space” for painting, “virtual time” for music, and “virtual power”
for the dance decades previously (cf. Langer, 1953). Virtual reality may encompass time,
space, power, afford synaesthetic experiences and even proprioceptive ones.
In his monumental survey of the “material culture” of microphysics in the twen-
tieth century, Peter Galison (1997) distinguished therein three subcultures, the
experimentalist, the instrumentalist, and the theoretical, each with a degree of rela-
tive autonomy and distinct histories which do not neatly coincide in their periodization,
but intercalate (each with a certain degree of immanent change, one might say). More
to the point, he contrasted two epistemic traditions throughout the history of twenti-
eth century microphysics, cutting across all three subcultures, but particularly imping-
ing on “traditions of instrument-making” and “ideals of experimentation”: the “im-
age” tradition, and the “logic” tradition (it is somewhat extravagant to refer to them, as
the author does, as the traditions of iconodules and iconoclasts). In the image tradi-
tion, the emphasis is on visual representation, mimetic or “homomorphic”, the goal
being “the production of images of such clarity that a single picture can serve as evi-
dence for a new entity or effect” (Galison, 1997, p. 19), a tradition culminating in the
bubble chamber. In the logic tradition, “counting (rather than picturing) machines
aggregate masses of data to make statistical arguments for the existence of a particle or
effect” (p. 19). To be sure, even followers of the image tradition had to analyse statisti-
cal evidence! The two traditions, the mimetic and the aniconic, came to coalesce from
the 1970s onwards, with the rise of electronic imagery, as experimental devices be-
came information machines. The story can be told in terms of the epochs of data, for
12 This can lead to a “trained incapacity” for wonder. The much publicized original photo of the blue planet taken by
astronauts was perhaps the most “iconic” of technoscientific photographs of the last six decades. Yet its impressive-
ness was somewhat lost on the Apollo astronauts themselves, who had become all too familiar with the matching
simulations during their training prior to the voyages. Dwelling too long in virtual reality can bring about
“holomelancholia”. After the much-quoted Weberian disenchantment of the (real) world, the disenchantment of
the virtual one.
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“in the late twentieth century the typical form of data in microphysics became ‘the controlled
image’: in many domains beyond particle physics, one sees the binding of picturing
with counts” (Galison, 1997, p. 809, my italics). An example: “radio astronomers grafted
their electronic deductions to visual astronomy with charged coupled detectors and
computers” (p. 809-10). In a nutshell, “the controllable image came to supplant the
century-old ideal of objectivity that the chemical photograph had embodied. Knowing
through the passive registration of the eye no longer stood apart from knowing through
manipulation” (p. 810). Apart from astronomy, of course, as we can manipulate so very
little in the heavens through “experimental astronomy”, working with miniaturized
models is a large part of the scientific enterprise. Scientists can create and manipulate
digital worlds at will, whatever the parameter space, the more so, the more the process-
ing power and speed of computers increase, as has been happening for the last fifty-
odd years, and will go on happening for the next few decades at least.
Perhaps the scientific domain where imaging technologies, based on microelec-
tronics and nuclear science, have had the most impact on the general public, apart per-
haps from cosmology, or impinged most directly on vital human interests, has been
that of cognitive neuroscience in the last few decades.13 The great advances in brain
imaging, with a succession of imaging technologies coming into play, whose acronyms
have become familiar (EEG, PETA, MRI), but it is the “functional” versions, such as
fMRI, which enable the researcher to view processes unfolding, not merely static
anatomy. It is functional neuroimaging which has been claimed as the major research
instrument in this field, certainly the one which has most impressed the public. The
diffusion of such images in magazines, pop science writing, educational videos and
films, and the like, have helped to lend credibility to the extravagant pronouncements
made with great fanfare by a number of neuroscientists, not so much about specific
brain science issues, but about perennial metaphysical and theological issues, on the
ontological status of the mind, the relation of the mind to the body, the issue of liber-
tarian free will, the nature of the self or the human person. In addition, the same ones,
or others, have published best-sellers, become media gurus, advertise therapy pro-
grams, personality change, self-help, cognitive enhancement, and so on, supposedly
on the basis of neuroscience and the allure of its imagery (cf. Thornton, 2011). Some
neuroscientists have become neuroeconomists, or even neuromarketing entrepre-
neurs, to promote ways in which brands might attract more customers, by selecting
the commercial messages most likely to activate the appropriate regions of the brain,
13 From time to time, imaging technologies can precipitate moral and political strife, in part because of their unan-
ticipated use, as in the case of fetal ultrasound images. The replacement of the stethoscope by ultrasound devices in
medicine may also bring strains in the doctor-patient relationship.
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as identified by neuro imaging studies. A kind of neurocentric perspective has emerged
in which social, cultural, political, economic phenomena are all related in the first
instance to the wiring or rewiring of the brain (cf. Tallis, 2011), something conducive
to “neuroessentialism”.
The question of the evidential status of images, of their weight in scientific argu-
mentation is raised acutely in this field, and much intra-disciplinary disputation has
taken place on this matter. In any case, the alleged grounding of the far-reaching meta-
physical theses advanced by neuroscientists on the latest imagery made availa-ble by
powerful new imaging tools is questionable, as very similar theses were advanced a cen-
tury ago, by brain scientists who propagandized them with equal certitude and fanfare.
2 On the epistemic implications of imagery in the hard sciences
We seem to have moved full circle from the Victorian era when visual models were prac-
tically mandatory in physics, through the era when visualizability was deemed as una-
vailable for the micro-world, understandable in quantum-physical terms only via ab-
stract, non-intuitable, models, and an aniconic mode prevailed in the philosophy of
science (“picture-thinking” was definitely downgraded by practically every school of
thought, banning imaginative projection of the molar into the molecular world),14 to
the present-day milieu when scientific research in the hard sciences, as well as scien-
tific publication and communication within science and of science to nonscientists, is
awash with visual images. It was claimed a couple of decades ago that visual imagery
would no longer have the importance it had enjoyed in the late twentieth century (cf.
Brunet, 2000): in fact, it has never been so important in the sciences as a whole. To be
sure, images, photographs, always need to be interpreted, according to prevalent meth-
odological canons, to be credited epistemically, but the point is that they are not sub-
sidiary or irrelevant to argumentation proper. This increased saliency of the image in
science (of machine images, digital visual images, prevalently), in the mainstream,
and not in the margins of scientific endeavour, stems in great measure from the much-
vaunted contemporary “Data Revolution”, the growing massive “cyberinfrastructure”
of science (“e-science”) – this is the term promulgated by the US National Academy of
Sciences –, with the multiplication, accelerated potentiation and miniaturization of
14 Cf. this fairly typical statement by a nuclear physicist: “electrons and photons are too small to be seen and must
therefore not be endowed with visual properties (…).The biblical injunction ‘Thou shalt not make thyself a graven im-
age’ needs to be taken just as seriously by today’s science as it was by the early Israelites” (Margenau, 1987, p. 46).
The converse surely does not follow, for we can see atoms, yet we are barred by extant theory from attributing visual
properties to them.
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computational devices of all kinds, sensors and digital cameras as well as ever more
powerful scopic, robotized, instruments with capacities for accessing, scanning, visu-
alizing the megaloscopic as well as the microscopic worlds (now the nanoscopic world
too) many orders of magnitude greater than earlier versions.15
Imaging, specifically in the mode of electronic digital visual imaging, reaches
into every phase of scientific inquiry, observational, experimental, simulational (or
virtual-experimental), modeling, even in mathematical research (“experimental math-
ematics”, where the experiments are also virtual, or “mathematical mapping”). Of
course, mathematical tools (and mathematically formulated scientific laws or algo-
rithms), in the broad sense of the “mathematical sciences” (logic, probability and sta-
tistics, and mathematics proper) are absolutely essential in all these phases, either
embedded in computational devices or in the analysis of computer-generated data:
there may be a kind of nonvicious circularity in that computer programs interrogate
computer-generated data (“analytics”, business or other). Computers, of course, work
on numerical or imagetic/graphic/diagrammatic/mapping/audio/video or word modes.
Computer-assisted proofs in mathematics, such as that of the four-colour theorem,
are still relatively infrequent, although it is not clear why this should be the case (Rus-
sian mathematicians called it “machine mathematics”): at least one mathematician,
who had published papers referring to his computer collaborator in theorem-proving
by a human pseudonym, ascribing this to “human-centric bigotry”.
This unprecedented combination of mathematical tools and machine-generated
images, especially digital visual images, which have proliferated in enormous quanti-
ties and exhibit every kind of resolution and magnification, even into the nanoscale (it
is a cliché to say that computers, initially dealing mainly in numbers and words, cur-
rently deal mainly with pictures), partly defines contemporary science. Some have
called it “cyberscience”, the third paradigm of sciencing, others have gone beyond this
to herald the fourth paradigm of science, highly data-intensive, massively computer-
indebted science. Some claim that a “new kind of science” has come into being (cf.
Wolfram, 2002), postulating a computational model of the universe-as-program. With
computer-like “rules” instead of the “laws” of nature, in the conventional understand-
ing of science, and the “book of nature” becomes, as it were, a cosmic “e-book” (but
15 The Earth system itself could become something like its own sensorium. This would come about as a result of the
multiplication of electronic nano-sensors which can be installed everywhere, diffused throughout as “smart dust”,
and the mapping by satellites, which can see into the ocean floor and into the interior of the Earth, and infer some-
thing of geo-history (remote sensing via the LANSATs, for example). In a more mundane fashion, the expansion of
the “Internet of things” and RFID systems connecting mobile devices, and sensor-endowed entities of all kinds,
natural and cultural, inorganic or organic (e.g., the barcoding of as many bio-species as possible), via our interme-
diation and remote sensing would assist in the process.
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full of 3-D pictures in colour).16 On Darwinian principles, which appeal to scientists
in every discipline, a few simple rules can generate inexhaustible novelty. Wolfram is
by no means alone in positing the cosmos to be a computer simulation, or at least en-
tertaining this novel metaphysical “world-hypothesis”.
Another way of characterizing the current state of the hard sciences, would be as
one of mathematical imagism, or, better, algorithmic imagism, since not all algorithms
need be mathematical (in any case, some mathematicians and scientists now claim
that algorithms have superseded free-standing equations, or should). Ours is certainly
a world shaped by both algorithms and machine images in our electronic screen-satu-
rated lives in and out of laboratories. In any case, numerical models or observational
findings tend to be visualized, “mapped” (“mapmaking” is now the business of every
science, and even mathematics), or “charted”, for ease of understanding, to stimulate
discovery, to improve pattern-recognition, through digital images (cf. Hall, 1992).
Mechanical models enjoyed preeminence in the late Victorian period, when
physicists like Kelvin claimed that they could not understand a physical process if they
could not visualize a mechanical model for it, thereby incurring the celebrated severe
strictures of Duhem (1906). This was followed by the anti-imagistic phase of math-
ematical idealism, mathématisme or logical empiricism. Neurath, the greatest propa-
gandist of the movement, and the most politically engaged, developed a system of
pictoral representation, the “Isotypes”, on which he rested great hopes for both public
enlightenment and scientific communication. Yet none of the monographs in the Inter-
national Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, which he founded, including Kuhn’s The struc-
ture of scientific revolutions, contained a single picture. This surely would not be repeated
in a comparable enterprise today. Now imagism, or, more broadly, data-ism, has ac-
quired full citizenship in science (and is struggling for a similar status in the humani-
ties and to a lesser degree in the social sciences)17 in the age of ubiquitous, ever-ex-
panding, world-encompassing electronic imagery. The regulative ideal of the “legibility
of the world” (Blumenberg, 1986) has been partially replaced by or at least comple-
mented with that of the imageability of the world, which can be effected thanks to the
wondrous and continuing sucesses of imaging technologies in our time. There was a
current of thought, often called “mathematical idealism” (we formulated the concept
of “mathematical imagism” in contrast with this position), in which precisely the de-
16 Actually, all the pictures in Wolfram’s book (there are a thousand of them) are in black and white, but surely this
could be “enhanced”.
17 A diverting example was the “Phillips machine” at LSE, built in 1949 by the engineer-economist A. W. Phillips.
This creaky hydraulic machine, replicas of which were still in use in 2009, provided a visual model of Keynesian
macro-economics and was indeed admiringly viewed by leading economists, though it missed the essence of keynesian
dynamics, which hinges on expectations and uncertainty, nor did it address the problem of inflation.
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mand for pictorial representations in scientific cognition, certainly in exact science,
in mathematical-experimental physics, was regarded as radically inappropriate. Two
academic philosophers who had formulated this position well before the quantum revo-
lution of the 1920s, Ernst Cassirer in Germany, and Léon Brunschvicg in France, wrote
extensively on the history and philosophy of physical science and mathematics.
According to this perspective, the advance of mathematization in theory-construction,
idealization, the transcending of all kinds of imagery or visual models in scientific cog-
nition, the emancipation from every vestige of anthropomorphism, was the path of
scientific progress: the primacy of intelligibilia over sensibilia in science had to be con-
stantly reasserted.
Even if we must recognize that not everything of interest to science can be imaged,
advances in this respect take place all the time, down to the atomic level and to a few
hundred million years after the big bang, but not beyond. And the fact that we can ob-
tain images of the remote cosmic past, the “retroverse”, shows that the telescopes in
question operate also as palaeoscopes, so to speak, and can do nothing else, given rela-
tivistic space-time.18 It is in cosmogony that the palaeoscopic function of science is
perhaps most effective in the whole range of what Whewell called the “palaeoetiolo-
gical sciences”.
Some scientists and mathematicians, as well as science writers in such maga-
zines as Wired, have been carried away by the data/image/virtualization explosion in
scientific research to the point of saying, perhaps not entirely as boutades, that the age
of theory in the sciences is over with the instauration of big data and electronic im-
agery (numerical data can be translated into pixels) arising from the new mode of pro-
duction of scientific data. Since data means potentially information, and even knowl-
edge, one might even call it the new mode of production of scientific knowledge, beyond
“mode 2” (cf. Gibbons et al., 1994), “mode 2.1”, but that would have to include the new
social relations (or, better, socio-technical relations) of knowledge production, col-
laboration in situ and beyond, via computer-mediated communications (CMC), in the
shape of the emerging “networked science”.19 It is alleged to be over, not so much be-
cause of any impasse in theory construction in microphysics or cosmology, or the ex-
perimental barrenness of the dominant grand theory in physics (though such claims
have been made from within the physics community itself, admittedly by a minority),
18 The term “chronoscope” has been suggested, but I believe my term “paleoscope” is more fitting.
19 The systems theorist Russell Ackoff (1989) constructed the fourfold hierarchy data-information-knowledge-
wisdom, which has become fashionable in business management literature. With data at the base, information has
to be extracted from data, and certified knowledge from information, which seems plausible. Wisdom, the highest-
level achievement, is another matter, being non-algorithmic by definition, and always, unlike the other three com-
ponents, in short supply at all times, not least when we most need it.
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or because the experimentalists, or what one might call the “observationalists” (espe-
cially the cosmic mappers in their epic undertakings) have finally won the battle for
supremacy against the theorists (but with “virtual experimentation”, i.e., computer
simulations, now added to physical or laboratory bench experimentation, practically
as co-equal if not more, at least in terms of time allotted and the intensiveness of such
work). Rather, it is argued that, with the immense sets of immense data sets now avail-
able and growing space, accompanied by exponential increases in computing speed
and data-handling capability via close collaborative work, not necessarily in situ,20 with
increasing pressures for online data sharing and for fast publication online in the sci-
entific community theory-work cannot and need not proceed as hitherto. With the com-
ing of the age of “networked science”, which, however, according to its chief prophet,
may take decades to realize its full potential (cf. Nielsen, 2012), in considerable part
data-driven (images and non-images), and of “networked facts” (cf. Weinberger, 2012),
science may not need sustained theorizing, or at least not the pursuit of High Theory,
any more, as a distinct and separate epistemic enterprise, with a commanding role in
the growth of scientific knowledge,21 as happened in the twentieth century, heralded
perhaps by the 1905 publication of the special, or “physical”, theory of relativity, if not
that of the general theory of relativity. The network metaphor has been around a long
time in the philosophy of science, in one way or another. Those who take it seriously
may be sympathetic to a coherentist theory of thruth, which need not be, though often
has been, associated with a rationalist epistemology and an idealistic metaphysics.
Versions of coherentism, a holistic empiricism, were embraced by Neurath and later
by Quine. In both cases their scientific holism stemmed in part from recognition of
the force of Duhem’s theses on how scientific tests in physics can never be simply that
of a single hypothesis, law-statement or theory in isolation, for it is always a compre-
hensive body of knowledge which is at stake in such situations, implicitly at least (cf.
Duhem, 1906).
20 The collectivization of scientific research is evident in the multiple-authorship phenomenon, with dozens and
dozens and even sometimes a couple of hundred signatories of short scientific research articles: one of its sources
was experimental nuclear physics, thus a by-product of big science, with its huge machines and decades-long ex-
periments, but it has spread far beyond that area, and even beyond laboratory science proper. Indeed, in 2011 a
response to an article questioning inclusive fitness theory in evolutionary biology, published in Nature, was signed
by 137 biologists! Public authorities and funding agencies promote collectivization of scientific research with finan-
cial and other incentives. Yet reward systems, such as the Nobel Prizes in the sciences, serve only for the recognition
of individuals, not of teams, not even recognizing the collaboration of more than three individuals (though via the
ranking of universities within and between countries, a collective recognition effect ensues).
21 But see a recent statement by a physicist: “Theoretical physics (…) is a kind of science distinct and somewhat
different from physics. When physicists work on a theory, they are not dealing directly with nature, but with an
abstract model in which they have already decided which aspects of reality must be absolutely retained, and which
ones can be dismissed” (Vignale,2011, p. 3, italics in the original).
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It is suggested that the huge, ever-expanding and multiplying data bases (num-
bers, words, images, graphs, tables, etc., and sound), comprising volumes measured
in terabytes and petabytes, which can be merged as well shared via the internet, can
only be analyzed pari passu, so to speak, on Bayesian paths. And indeed Bayesian infer-
ence has become the commanding type of inference in much scientific or science-based
work in all empirical domains statistical regressions, or neural networks, deployed in
every phase of market-economic activity. Bayesianism, it has been claimed, owes its
revival and indeed its current dominance to the computer revolution and the big data
explosion of recent years, still going on (cf. Hand, 2007).22
Bayesian inductivism is today a major position, possibly the major position, in
the philosophy of science, or rather the methodology of science; its neo-Baconian
resonances would justify calling its current program as something like that of a novum
organum redivivus. To be sure, there are, of course, other anti-deductivist positions
amongst those who endorse the “semantic view of [scientific] theories”, according to
which theories should be regarded as families of models, in one fashion or another,
such as Rom Harré, Bas van Fraassen, Ronald Giere, who in other ways stand for very
different epistemological positions, “referential realism”, “constructive empiricism”,
“perspectival realism”, respectively (not to mention John Worrall’s “structural real-
ism”). All the works on the data-drivenness of empirical inquiry stress predictive suc-
cesses, usually relatively short-run, list innumerable examples, and point to the pre-
dictive power still to come from big data, issuing from our own ever more frequent
digital acts or from other instrumental sources, owing to algorithms and programs ca-
pable of analyzing in ultra-fast fashion many thousands of attributes of scientific or
medical objects at once, unsurveyable by humans (predicting crime just before it hap-
pens, predicting illnesses before symptoms manifest themselves in the case of “self-
trackers”, neuroscientists turned neuromarketers predicting shopping behaviour,
medical scientists predicting how long anyone can live, predictions of song hits or film
blockbusters etc.). But explanatory power, or more specifically, explanatory depth, is
rarely stipulated as a prime desideratum, though for Popperians (cf. Watkins, 1984),
and some other philosophers of science, such as Rescher (1978), the growth of science
involves a kind of ladder of theories with ever-increasing explanatory range and depth.
Similarly Toulmin long ago stressed that explanation, rather than prediction, is the
prime goal of science proper, as distinct from applied science. Toulmin (1961), though
for a time, under the covering law model, the paradigm-case of scientific knowledge
22 A comprehensive discussion of Bayesianism can be found in a summa by one of its leading exponents, Salmon
(2005). A sophisticated discussion of the philosophical issues around the much-publicized antagonism between
the Bayesian outlook and Popper can be found in a paper by Gelman & Shalizi (2013).
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entailed a logical symmetry between explanation and prediction). Toulmin considered
Babylonian astronomy the paradigm case of predictivist science. Feyerabendian phi-
losophers of science later attempted to vindicate the legitimacy of this style of science,
as against the Greek theoretical tradition. Today some strands of science, with their
strong emphasis on algorithms for predictive purposes (predictive analytics), or algo-
rithms instead of theories or equations, exemplify another semi-Babylonian phase of
science (only “semi” because that work takes place against the background of a corpus
of well-established theories). Or we could call it “positivist”, like Stephen Hawking: “I
(…) am a positivist who believes that physical theories are just mathematical models
we construct, and that it is meaningless to ask if they correspond to reality, just whether
they predict observations” (Hawking, 1997, p. 169).
This is not to say that Bayesianism is necessarily incompatible under some
construals with some key exigencies of Popperian methodology, though some of its ex-
ponents in the philosophy of science have seen it as completely superseding the
Popperian vision of the aims of science (cf. Howson & Urbach, 1989). Crudely put, one
could say that in data-intensive science (which is also visualization-intensive: a good
deal of today’s datasphere, in the sciences as elsewhere, could be called an imagesphere
or videosphere), algorithms are referred to far more often than laws, models invoked
far more than theories, the success of predictions far more often than the power of
explanations, utility rather than systematicity or architectonics. These shifts in epis-
temological emphases go together with the changes in the moral economy of science,
the emergence of “post-academic science”, in the characterization by the physicist John
Ziman (the PLACE model), such as the rise of proprietary knowledge-production (cf.
Ziman, 2004). Thus, besides these substantial changes in the scientific ethos, we should
take into account a re-orientation in the logos of science, in epistemology and method-
ology, as we noted, and also in ontology, with the shift to a digitalist or discontinuist
outlook, to computational and informational models of all domains of inquiry, the pro-
pensity to regard statistical phenomena as the underlying reality, what has been called
“stochasticism” (cf. Galison, 1997, p. 738 ff.), often associated with the ergodic axiom.23
These ideational currents, if contested, may be gaining ascendancy.
23 The “ergodic axiom” is, put very simply, the assumption that the observed phenomena, or large data sets already
available for statistical analysis, provide a fair sample of the domain under scrutiny (Davidson, 1991; 2007). This
would rule out Taleb’s “black swans” or Mandelbrot’s “wild randomness” (“second-order indeterminism”), but, as
we have seen in recent years, events, catastrophic or near-catastrophic ones, which were not supposed to happen in
millions and millions of years, according to standard financial economics, did happen. As pointed out by many
critics of mainstream economics, this axiom rules out uncertainty as a distinct epistemic or ontological modality,
subsuming it under risk (cf. Martins, 2012, ch. 5). Economists and engineers often characterize as “irrational” the
lay public’s fear of catastrophic events with extremely low probabilities, such as meltdowns in nuclear power sta-
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In any case, it is argued that in the era of cyberscience, science is not longer so
much “theory-driven”, as in the twentieth century, in physics and chemistry in par-
ticular, a circumstance reflected and apotheosized in some currents of the philosophy
of science, not least in Popper and dissident Popperians like Lakatos or Watkins, as
“tool-driven”. The “tools” comprise not just hand tools, or the inexpensive table-top
devices that were sufficient for the Rutherford era of atomic physics, but the ever
“smarter” miniaturized equivalents of much bigger, more powerful high-energy ma-
chines, or laboratory instruments, but also instances of big science, large technologi-
cal systems, the LHC of CERN being the ultimate exemplar of the genus. We could also
say that it is computer-driven, with ever-more powerful instrumentalities for obser-
vation, imaging and measurement of the microscopic/nanoscopic and megaloscopic
worlds, and indeed the computer is today the tool for making cognitive tools par excel-
lence. Inasmuch as it is tool-driven/computer-driven, instead of theory-driven, it is
also data-driven, with the explosion of data-sets and the now normal orders of magni-
tude of petabytes in data volumes, and soon with even higher orders of magnitude.24
Some scientists now speak of an emerging “fourth paradigm” of science: after the theo-
retical (“analytical”), the experimental (empirical), and the simulation methods para-
digms, that of data-driven science or data-intensive scientific discovery (cf. Hey;
Tamsley & Toll, 2009). In this age data reign (data include images or are susceptible to
visualization through computerized graphics, so “imagification” goes hand in hand with
quantification), and algorithms rule. The processing of the data deluge via computa-
tion, the universal instrument of science today, is key. Some proclaim the end of theory,
and even those who would not go this far stress phenomenological modelling and pre-
dictive power rather than theory development in the context of the “fourth paradigm”
of science (cf. Martins, 2012, ch. 3).
Concurrently, and not just coincidentally, tool-driven science is also team-work
driven or “collaboratorial”. Insofar as it is tool-driven, if the outer frontier of techno-
logical possibility in “excavating” nature were reached, or, more likely, if funding for
ever larger/more powerful telescopes, terrestrial or in outer space, or huge high-en-
ergy particle accelerators and the like, were no longer available, basic science would
tions, but there is wisdom in that fear: indeed the Great Recession was deemed an event of extremely low probability
by financial economists (including the recipient of the Nobel Prize in economics in 2013), as was an event of poten-
tially disastrous consequences for the world financial system, the collapse of a major financial firm.
24 The “digital humanities” or “humanities 3.0” field are characterized by the same data-drivenness of the field,
collectivization (multiple authorship and team-work the new normal), on-line sharing, an emphasis on the role of
images in research, and a similar downgrading of theory, quite understandable in this case in the light of the high
theory phase of postmodernism and deconstructionism, when literary theory assumed an egregious, paradoxical
superiority vis-à-vis literature itself.
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more or less come to a stop (cf. Rescher, 1978; 1984). Some physicists, like Steven
Weinberg (1974), have warned repeatedly that cuts in funding for such machines will
end “the search for the laws of nature”.
In his late treatise on logic as the theory of inquiry, Dewey (1938) argued for the
criterion of “warranted assertibility” for propositional science, though of course he
stressed the experimental and instrumental phases of scientific inquiry (we don’t need
to endorse the pragmatist theory of truth to share this emphasis). Sixty-odd years later,
at a time when electronic imagery pervades science, this exigency should be supple-
mented by that of what we might call, by analogy with the Deweyan formulation, war-
ranted imageability, for the admissibility, pertinence, reliability, validity, the eviden-
tial weight and argumentative bearings of images in science are matters that demand
continual scrutiny (there are cases of evidentially spurious images in matters of con-
siderable import in biology and even in physics). Thus in science “trust in numbers”
has to be accompanied by “trust in images” (an issue in modern science since the in-
vention of Galileo’s telescope in 1609), given appropriate quality control mechanisms.
The “principle of permanent control” (cf. Kaufmann, 1944, p. 53 ff.) surely applies
here as well as in the propositional or numerical corpus of scientific tenets, theorems,
theories and models, as the potential falsifiability, corrigibility or revisability of their
import and scope of validity of any such must be ensured, according to fallibilism,
even if the falsifiability criterion has been recently attacked by eminent physicists.25
Doubtless, “networked science”, an expanded, hyper-connected, globalized, telematic
version of Fleck’s “thought collectives” (cf. Fleck, 1979), or, more concretely, scien-
tists-in-networks, must agree on the epistemic warrants of one may call networked im-
ages. These are mostly digital visual images or graphical displays of one sort or another,
“e-graphics” (as I have called them), by analogy with “networked facts”, which may be
conveyed also in non-imagetic fashion (in general, keyed to “e-readings” or digital
readouts).26 Data in the sciences today, even in the field sciences, tend to be mostly
capta, obtained by technological devices increasingly coupled to ICTs (even the petri
dish), with the advance of the automation of some phases of science (especially obser-
vational science) and of science in silico.
25 In the case of mathematics, “weak fallibility” along the lines of a Lakatosian philosophy of mathematics.
Paraconsistent mathematics is a recent development, though paraconsistent logics have been around for several
decades (Newton da Costa being a key exponent), latterly in the form of “dialetheism” (Graham Priest).
26 In an influential work, the astrophysicist A. S. Eddington asserted that “pointer-readings” were the mark of
exact science (cf. Eddington, 1928). Today, pointer-readings have been largely replaced by digital read-outs. Hence
I have suggested the term “e-readings” as the twentieth-one century counterpart of the twentieth century pointer-
readings in the exact sciences (they are also ubiquitous in medicine and many other fields).
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Automation of science work has gone further with the development of “robot
scientists”. The “robot scientist” was introduced a few years ago in an article written
by a team of British geneticists in Nature, welcomed by an editorial in the same issue of
the journal. It consisted of a computer software program that could review the litera-
ture on a pre-given problem, formulate a hypothesis and test it on the data base sup-
plied: if rejected, it would pursue a new hypothesis, and so on. The first version simply
confirmed existing knowledge, but a later version made a discovery, with findings not
previously available in the literature (all the researches were in the molecular biology
of yeast). Further development by the same team may lead to improved knowledge dis-
covery by software programs. The usual classification of laboratories into “wet” and
“dry” will need to be supplemented by a third category, what we might call the ultra dry
laboratory, with no humans in attendance.
In terms of a possible neuroscience of science, or, perhaps one should say, of a
neurophilosophy of science, it might be asked, finally, what difference to the scientific
enterprise the novel features of permanent search, capture and assessment of digital
images in every phase of the scientific life may make. Especially as human scientists,
professional or “citizen scientists” (as distinct from robot scientists), are in every other
phase of their lives immersed in digital images also (though smart robots could, and
almost certainly will, also be afforded immersion in the digital imaginarum via the
“Internet of things”). This epistemic culture seems likely to prevail, with ever more
extensive, continuous and multimodal interactions between humans and computers,
or between humans and creatures of artificial intelligence, androids, smart robots and
the like, though humans may be endowed with “smart” brain-implanted devices con-
joined to electronic digital super-senses,27 between human scientists and robot sci-
entists, if not a “fusion”, “melding”, “merger” or “symbiosis” between humans and AI
devices,28 between wetware (fleshware, meatware) and software. This techno-human
condition has often been proclaimed as inevitable, imminent, and eminently desir-
able since the 1960s, by a number of computer scientists. They seem to be very fond of
27 Locke (1970 [1700]) noted that humans lack microscopic eyes to see the ultimate particles. With prosthetic mi-
croscopic eyes, the major electronic digital super-sense under development, we will be able to see, not the ultimate
particles, but certainly deep into the world of matter.
28 Oddly, the terms “hybrid” and “hybridization”, so ubiquitous today, have not been much used in this context,
though the term “chimera” is familiar in biomedical commentary. I have not assumed any kind of principle of sym-
metry, or parity, ontological, methodological or epistemological, between human and non-human (robotic, compu-
tational or other) contributors, agents or actants, natural or machine intelligence, in the processes of scientific
investigation in or out of the laboratory. And I have not ruled out the concept of collective agency (with humans as
co-agents), even if it has to manifest itself with and through technological means and media. “Collective episte-
mology” surely does not entail symmetry amongst knowers, or epistemic agents, of varied kinds.
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the rather tricky biological metaphor of “symbiosis”, which they tend to literalize, in a
somewhat eschatological mode, though some of them would settle for another, that of
“co-evolution” of humans in general, and scientists in particular, and technology, which
need not entail symbiosis in the strict sense. We might even plausibly envisage the
coming of new epistemic cultures, arising out of the circumstance that scientists work
as consumers and producers of images in and out of laboratories (wet, dry or ultra-
dry), observatories, and other networked scientific research sites, in close association
with numerical models, in a quite unprecedented fashion (prevalently “post-photo-
graphic” digital images, yielded by image technologies (cf. Ihde, 1993) and scanning
devices of ever greater electronic, photonic, nanotech or quantum tech sophistication).
Much the same could be said of “knowledge-workers” in general, the variously named
“cybertariat”, “digital proletariat”, “cognitariat”, “digerati”, “artificial intelligentsia”,
“virtual intelligentsia”, as a whole. This new form of scientific life may in due course
have a significant impact on our pre-existing cognitive abilities, perceptual or con-
ceptual, even induce a rewiring of the brain, with lasting effect, in particular thought
collectives, or even on the Great Society of WWW-linked “networked science” (though
the brain is not any kind of digital computer, digital computers or, eventually, quan-
tum computers, may change the brain to suit themselves, as it were, through various
selection effects, natural or cultural). Consider the “Flynn effect”, the steady rise in
average IQ of national populations observed in a number of industrialized countries,
including Japan, over several decades from the mid-twentieth century until quite re-
cently. The most substantial gains in IQ scores were in visual-spatial intelligence, as
we might expect from continual exposure of generations to electronic media, and lat-
terly to video games on a vast scale.
Similar questions might be asked a fortiori concerning non-scientific life in the
current stage of the civilization of (electronic digital) images, in which all media (the
computer today can itself be regarded as a medium, indeed increasingly as the me-
dium of media, via smart phones or other mobile devices, wearable or ubiquitous com-
puting) are digitized, in which the majority eventually will be made up of digital na-
tives, and in which the pressures to virtualize scientific as well as other activities,
cognitive and non-cognitive, seem irresistible. There has been much speculation –
some guidance can be gleaned from comparisons with previous revolutions in ICTs
(cf. Logan, 2004) – as to the difference ubiquitous and time-intensive Internet usage
by such a large proportion of Western populations, with practically everyone immersed
in the digital imaginarium of our times, or the addiction to videogames, may make to
our cognitive dispositions and powers, such as the outsourcing of memory, reliance on
external storage systems, biassing the economy of attention, a propensity to “digital
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distraction”.29 As far as virtual reality is concerned, a portion of the digital demos is
already attuned to the virtual rather than to the real, or at least to augmented reality,30
deeming it, in effect, ontically and axiologically privileged (cf. Heim, 1993). There is
likely to be an increased call for avatars to stand in for us in the most varied situations
and activities, blurring ever more the boundaries between the virtual and the real: per-
haps an “X-reality” is emerging through the interweaving of the proceedings of real
persons and their virtual clones (cf. Coleman, 2011), or an infinite virtual reality
deprivileging the real real (cf. Blascovich & Bailerson, 2011). In the civilization of dig-
ital images, of ever-multiplying online tools or apps, the outsourcing to virtual or arti-
ficial reality of practices of all kinds, scientific or other, in one fashion or another, is
likely to proceed unrelentingly: indeed, triumphalists speak of a “rising tide of cogni-
tive outsourcing” (which will include an ever-expanding “Internet of things”). Accord-
ingly, an increasing amount of science work, including scientific discovery, would be
done for us, not by us, by advanced “robot scientists”, surrogate epistemic agents, which
will be getting smarter and smarter, even if the prospect of AGI (Artificial General In-
telligence) still seems distant, even with the capacity for “deep learning” now accruing
to intelligent devices. Some of it is taking place far beyond our planet, via our space
probes and missions, outsourced, like everything else today, though even more so,
space-time-wise. One wonders how far co-attribution to these artificial epistemic
agents of their knowledge production shared with humans will proceed (thinking of
the mathematician I mentioned earlier, who co-signed his proofs with an imaginary
human-sounding name for his computer, whose assistance, in his view, was crucial). I
suppose this is an issue that pertains as much to artificial ethics as to artificial episte-
mology: will they ever become full members of the “scientific community”?
But whether the scenarios of the attenuation, if not the obliteration, of the
boundaries between the digital and the physical such as those between computation
and bench experimentation, the virtual and the real, natural and artificial (algorith-
mic) intelligence, via the spread of mind/brain-machine interfaces, or between or-
ganic matter and information, as enunciated by synthetic biology, which claims the
potential ability to read and edit the genomic information of all living organisms, will
29 Complaints by educators and cultural critics about the hindrances to or even the loss of the capacity for sustained
attention go back to the late nineteenth century, traced to the analog media of the time and metropolitan civilization,
its visual culture and soundscapes, marketing practices, entertainment industries, and work life. The concept of the
“economy of attention” is perhaps more recent, like the expression “digital distraction” (cf. Gordon & Bogen, 2009).
30 Google is marketing augmented reality spectacles. Augmented reality will therefore be easily available to every-
one via one wearable device, not just to citizen scientists. As mentioned before, a number of microelectronic devices
have been designed which could make everyone a super-percipient in visual terms. Scientists are also working on
other digital electronic prosthetic super-senses (including a nano-ear).
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be realized, is another matter. Along the same lines, investors have been advised that
with three-dimensional printing becoming ever-cheaper and fantastically versatile,
there will be no longer any important difference between a computerized artifact de-
signed in “the cloud” and a real, physical thing. This may well be the next stage of “im-
age capitalism”, or indeed of manufacturing capitalism, if all goes well. Time will tell.
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